The public loss game: An experimental study of public bads by Schosser, Stephan & Vogt, Bodo
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Schosser, Stephan; Vogt, Bodo
Working Paper
The public loss game: An experimental
study of public bads
Working paper series in economics, No. 33
Provided in cooperation with:
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
Suggested citation: Schosser, Stephan; Vogt, Bodo (2011) : The public loss game:
An experimental study of public bads, Working paper series in economics, No. 33,
urn:nbn:de:swb:90-241537 , http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50508The public loss game - an 
experimental study of public 
bads
by Stephan Schosser and Bodo Vogt
No. 33  |  August 2011
WORKING PAPER SERIES IN ECONOMICS
KIT – University of the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg and
National Laboratory of the Helmholtz Association econpapers.wiwi.kit.eduImpressum
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsforschung (IWW)
Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie und Statistik (ETS)
Schlossbezirk 12
76131 Karlsruhe
KIT – Universität des Landes Baden-Württemberg und 
nationales Forschungszentrum in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft
Working Paper Series in Economics
No. 33,  August 2011
ISSN  2190-9806




The Public Loss Game  




aKarlsruhe Institute of Technology, Zirkel 2, 76128 Karlsruhe, Germany 
bUniverstity of Magdeburg, Universtitätsplatz 2, 39106 Magdeburg, Germany 
20. June 2011 
Abstract 
We analyze cooperative behavior of participants who faced a loss. In particular, we extend the 
Public Good Game by a fixed loss in the beginning of every period. We show that humans 
change their behavior compared to corresponding studies with gains only. First, in contrast to 
literature  on  gains,  we  observe  significant  order  effects.  When  participants  first  play  a 
treatment with punishment, they cooperate less and face higher punishment costs than when 
first playing a treatment without punishment. The changes are that drastic that punishment 
does not pay in the first case, while it does in the later. Second, for participants first playing 
without  punishment  the  contributions  in  the  very  first  period  of  play  determine  the 
contributions throughout both treatments of the game, yielding higher contributions in the 
punishment treatment than when playing with gains. Participants punishing first, show no 
comparable behavior. 
 
Keywords: Public Good, Punishment, Losses, Experiment.  
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We live in a time of crises. Several advanced economies face the severe thread of bankruptcy; 
whole populations in Africa and the Middle East loose the basis for their lives in their fight for 
democracy;  and  environmental  threads,  like  Fukushima  or  CO2  emissions,  endanger  other 
countries. All these crises lead to large-scale cooperation across nations. Europe offers credit 
to financially save their struggling partners; the US military supports the fight against dictators 
and the whole world almost instantly sent technical equipment and manpower to Japan after 
the  first  plant  in  Fukushima  exploded.  This  result  is  surprising  as  experimental  work  on 
cooperation  of  the  last  decades  confirms  one  central  fact:  Although  strangers  initially 
contribute to a high extend, voluntary support for others decreases over time [12, 28]. While 
varying in height across different cultures, this effect can be found worldwide [3]. Between the 
examples above and the experimental studies one central difference exists. In experiments 
participants  distribute  money  they  received  as  “present”  from  the  experimenter,  while 
voluntary contribution among the described nations is a direct response to the losses different 
humans  faced.  Therefore,  one  central  question  emerges:  What  are  the  characteristics  of 
cooperation in the loss case? 
 
Biologists, psychologists and economists have intensively studied cooperation under gains. 
Different motivations for cooperation exist [20]. Kin selection [1, 23], i.e. close relatedness 
between  different  individuals,  fosters  cooperation.  This  motive  only  explains  cooperation 
among relatives. Reciprocity [21, 22], i.e. cooperation with others who cooperated before, 
circumvents  this  restriction  and  allows  for  cooperation  among  strangers.  Finally,  group 
selection  [13],  i.e.  selecting  interaction  partners,  ensures  cooperation  as  cooperative 
individuals  join  other  cooperative  individuals  who  in  consequence  do  not  decrease  their 
cooperation levels. Aside these justifications for cooperation, altruistic punishment ensures 
cooperative  behavior  among  participants  [1,  4,  14].  Here,  participants  use  part  of  their 
earnings to reduce the payoff of other group members. Although the cultural background of 
participants strongly influences punishment behavior [5, 14], several basic properties do not 
differ across different subject pools: with the use of punishment the degree of cooperation 
remains stable; participants use anti-social punishment, i.e. a fraction of participants punishes 
others  although  being  more  cooperative  then  themselves;  punishers  accept  the  costs  for 
punishment often resulting in lower overall payoffs than in experiments without punishment. 
Surprisingly, even informal punishment, i.e. stating disapproval with the behavior of others 
instead  of  direct  monetary  sanctions,  ensures  high  degrees  of  cooperation  [19].  Is  the 
punishment  mechanism  extended  by  a  reputation  mechanism,  the  degree  of  cooperation 
increases  even  further  [24].  In  sum,  punishment  is  the  preferred  mechanism  to  ensure 
cooperation – even among strangers. Even participants having the chance to choose between 
an institution with punishment and an institution without punishment prefer the punishment 
institution  [11,  25].  In  addition  punishment  does  not  crowd  out  voluntary  cooperation:  If 














they show exactly the same behavior as when not having faced the punishment scenario before 
– at least when participants play under gains and punishment is perceived as fair [7]. 
 
Public  Good  Games  are  a  prominent  approach  to  analyze  punishment,  cooperation  and 
reciprocity.  In  one  popular  version  of  the  Public  Good  Game  [3],  participants  interact  in 
groups of four for ten periods. Each group member receives an endowment of 20 tokens each 
period.  Then  the  participants  choose  how  many  tokens  they  want  to  contribute  to  a  joint 
project and how many tokens to keep for them. For each token kept, a participant receives 1 
Experimental Currency Unit (ECU), while all members of the group receive 0.4 ECU per 
token contributed. In groups where all participants keep all tokens for themselves, the payoff 
per participant is 20 ECU. If all participants contribute everything into the group project, the 
overall payoff per participant is 32 (= 0.4x20x4) ECU. Hence, each participant can choose to 
earn 20 ECU without any risk, while they can earn up to 32 ECU by risking to be exploited by 
the other group members. 
 
In experiments, one typically adds punishment to the Public Good Game by displaying the 
contributions of all other group members after the distribution decision. Participants can than 
assign up to 10 deduction points to each other group member depending on their contributions. 
Per assigned deduction point the punishing participant pays one 1 ECU, while the punished 
participant looses 3 ECU.  
 
Figure 1: Impact of equivalent changes in earnings on utility under gains and losses. According to prospect theory, which is widely accepted 
among behavioral economists, methods transferring monetary payoffs in utility have two central properties: (1) Utility functions are s-shaped 
and individuals value losses higher than gains. In cooperative situations the shape of a utility function has a severe impact on the decision 
situation. If a certain fraction of the payoff is fixed and a variable part is added, the variable part has only minor impact on utility. This is 
visualized in the right part of this figure. Doubling earnings (∆x) leads to a small increase in utility (∆y1). If individuals faced a loss before 
their decision, the impact of the fixed payoff is small, while the same increase in payoffs (∆x) leads to a drastic increase of utility (∆y2) 
 
In  Public  Good  experiments  without  punishment  one  typically  observes  mediocre 
contributions to the public good in the first periods, which decrease over time. Almost all 
participants  choose  to  play  the  riskless  strategy  in  the  end  of  the  experiment.  While  in 
treatments with punishment participants tend to resort to the risky strategy throughout the 




During the last years, prospect theory [17, 18, 27, 15, 16] is often used to explain human 
behavior. According to this theory utility functions are s-shaped and individuals value losses 
higher  than  gains  (see  Figure  1).  The  additional  utility  (∆y1)  participants  receive  if  all 
participants cooperate, compared to groups without any contributions are small in the gain 
case. Namely, if all participants can guarantee earnings of 20 ECU by egoistic behavior, their 
increase in utility is small if all increase their earnings to 32 ECU by contributing everything. 
The situation changes, if participants act under losses. E.g., if all participants receive a loss of 
32 ECU in the beginning of each period, they can reach earnings of 0 ECU per period by 
showing full cooperation, while they receive -10 ECU when being uncooperative. The impact 
of the same difference in earnings (∆x) is big, when calculating the utility change (∆y2) of a 
participant. Given this observation, changes in mediocre levels of contribution have a stronger 
impact  on  utility  when  analyzing  losses,  than  when  analyzing  gains.  Participants  have  to 
cooperate much more to reach the same levels of utility under losses, than they have to under 
gains. Therefore, effects of emotions [3] or reciprocity [20] should be much clearer to observe 
than in experiments with gains. 
 
Table 1: Frequency and average height of social and anti-social punishment per group: This table gathers information concerning punishment 
in both session types. As Social Punishment, we summarize all situations, in which the current participant contributed more than the group 
member he might punish. Anti-Social Punishment stands for all other situation, i.e. when the other group member contributed more or the 
same amount as the current participant. The column ‘#’ indicates the number of occurrences of corresponding situations, ‘Freq.’ stands for the 
proportion of punishments divided by the value in ‘#’. The column ‘Avg.’ finally specifies the average amount of ECU a participant invested 
in punishment of other group members. Notice, that in three groups (5, 8, 11) of the NP_PU sessions no participant ever deviated from full 
contribution. Hence, no participant of these groups could ever punish socially. 
	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠPunishment	 ﾠ Anti-ﾭ‐Social	 ﾠPunishment	 ﾠ All	 ﾠPunishment	 ﾠ
Grp.	 ﾠ
NP_PU	 ﾠ PU_NP	 ﾠ NP_PU	 ﾠ PU_NP	 ﾠ NP_PU	 ﾠ PU_NP	 ﾠ
#	 ﾠ Freq.	 ﾠ Avg.	 ﾠ #	 ﾠ Freq.	 ﾠ Avg.	 ﾠ #	 ﾠ Freq.	 ﾠ Avg.	 ﾠ #	 ﾠ Freq.	 ﾠ Avg.	 ﾠ Freq.	 ﾠ Avg.	 ﾠ Freq.	 ﾠ Avg.	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ 66.7%	 ﾠ 0.67	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ 89.7%	 ﾠ 0.90	 ﾠ 108	 ﾠ 15.7%	 ﾠ 0.16	 ﾠ 91	 ﾠ 7.7%	 ﾠ 0.08	 ﾠ 20.8%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.34	 ﾠ 27.5%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.38	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ 91.7%	 ﾠ 0.92	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ 64.7%	 ﾠ 0.65	 ﾠ 108	 ﾠ 0.0%	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ 86	 ﾠ 7.0%	 ﾠ 0.07	 ﾠ 9.2%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.28	 ﾠ 23.3%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.06	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ 100.0%	 ﾠ 1.00	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ 75.9%	 ﾠ 0.76	 ﾠ 105	 ﾠ 0.0%	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ 91	 ﾠ 2.2%	 ﾠ 0.02	 ﾠ 12.5%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.54	 ﾠ 20.0%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.67	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ 88.9%	 ﾠ 0.89	 ﾠ 59	 ﾠ 71.2%	 ﾠ 0.71	 ﾠ 111	 ﾠ 6.3%	 ﾠ 0.06	 ﾠ 61	 ﾠ 9.8%	 ﾠ 0.10	 ﾠ 12.5%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.21	 ﾠ 40.0%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.25	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 46	 ﾠ 76.1%	 ﾠ 0.76	 ﾠ 120	 ﾠ 0.0%	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ 74	 ﾠ 16.2%	 ﾠ 0.16	 ﾠ 0.0%	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ 39.2%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.98	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ 100.0%	 ﾠ 1.00	 ﾠ 57	 ﾠ 57.9%	 ﾠ 0.58	 ﾠ 114	 ﾠ 0.0%	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ 63	 ﾠ 9.5%	 ﾠ 0.10	 ﾠ 5.0%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.15	 ﾠ 32.5%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.68	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠ 44	 ﾠ 15.9%	 ﾠ 0.16	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ 77.8%	 ﾠ 0.78	 ﾠ 76	 ﾠ 2.6%	 ﾠ 0.03	 ﾠ 102	 ﾠ 2.0%	 ﾠ 0.02	 ﾠ 7.5%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.13	 ﾠ 13.3%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.28	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ 66.7%	 ﾠ 0.67	 ﾠ 120	 ﾠ 2.5%	 ﾠ 0.03	 ﾠ 117	 ﾠ 3.4%	 ﾠ 0.03	 ﾠ 2.5%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.03	 ﾠ 5.0%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.09	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ 82.6%	 ﾠ 0.83	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ 100.0%	 ﾠ 1.00	 ﾠ 97	 ﾠ 6.2%	 ﾠ 0.06	 ﾠ 108	 ﾠ 2.8%	 ﾠ 0.03	 ﾠ 20.8%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.77	 ﾠ 12.5%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.25	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠ 35	 ﾠ 57.1%	 ﾠ 0.57	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ 66.7%	 ﾠ 0.67	 ﾠ 85	 ﾠ 12.9%	 ﾠ 0.13	 ﾠ 114	 ﾠ 0.0%	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ 25.8%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.84	 ﾠ 3.3%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.21	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 32	 ﾠ 62.5%	 ﾠ 0.63	 ﾠ 120	 ﾠ 0.8%	 ﾠ 0.01	 ﾠ 88	 ﾠ 2.3%	 ﾠ 0.02	 ﾠ 0.8%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.01	 ﾠ 18.3%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.38	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ 83.3%	 ﾠ 0.83	 ﾠ 49	 ﾠ 85.7%	 ﾠ 0.86	 ﾠ 102	 ﾠ 18.6%	 ﾠ 0.19	 ﾠ 71	 ﾠ 49.3%	 ﾠ 0.49	 ﾠ 28.3%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.82	 ﾠ 64.2%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐3.78	 ﾠ
All	 ﾠ 174	 ﾠ 62.6%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.97	 ﾠ 374	 ﾠ 73.3%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.97	 ﾠ 1266	 ﾠ 5.2%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.12	 ﾠ 1066	 ﾠ 8.0%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.42	 ﾠ 12.2%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.34	 ﾠ 24.9%	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.08	 ﾠ
 
Experimental Results We report the results of an experiment on public goods with losses. 
The experiment is identical to the experiment introduced by Fehr [3], except for a loss all 
participants received in each period at the height of the maximum earnings the participants 
could reach under full cooperation, namely at height 32. We conducted our experiments at the   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
 
5 
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and compare our results with results from a public good 
experiment conducted in Bonn during an intercultural study [14]. We first give an overview of 
the punishment behavior observed, before we analyze the contributions of the participants and 
their payoffs. As participants changed their behavior between both session types, we put our 
focus on the differences between session types. 
 
Punishment: According to existing analyses of public good games (see e.g. [4, 3, 14]) public good experiments with and without punishment 
should not show any order effects. Therefore, we analyze punishment behavior in the Public Loss Game with a focus on order (see  
Table 1). An analysis of punishment behavior shows that participants in first playing in a 
treatment  without  punishment  and  in  a  treatment  with  punishment  afterwards  (NP_PU 
sessions) punish less (Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.046, Z = -1.994, W = 115.5, U = 
37.5) and face lower punishment costs (Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.026, Z = -2.223, 
W = 111.5, U = 33.5) than participants who play the other sequence of treatments (in PU_NP 
sessions).  When  analyzing  Social  Punishment,  i.e.  punishment  of  less  cooperative  group 
members, and Anti Social Punishment, i.e. punishment of equally or more cooperative group 
members, we neither see this effect in the frequency (Social Punishment: Mann-Whitney U, 
two-tailed, p = 0.393, Z = -0.855, W = 120.0, U = 42.0; Anti Social Punishment: Mann-
Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.297, Z = -1.044, W = 132, U = 54) nor the height (Social 
Punishment: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.594, Z = -0.533, W = 124.5, U = 46.5; Anti 
Social Punishment: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.117, Z = -1.566, W = 123, U = 45) of 
punishment.  Therefore,  we  calculate  the  difference  between  own  contribution  and  the 
contribution  of  a  group  member  and  bin  punishment  accordingly.  Hence,  we  split  Social 
Punishment into the intervals [-20,-11] and [-10,-1], while we split Anti-Social Punishment 
into [0], [1,10] and [11,20] (see Figure 2). Using this grouping, we find differences in the 
frequency and height of punishment for the interval [-20,-11] (Freq.: Mann-Whitney U, one-
tailed, p = 0.040, Z = -1.873, W = 92, U = 26, Avg.: Mann-Whitney U, one-tailed, p = 0.040, 
Z = -1.787, W = 92, U = 26). All other intervals show no significant differences ([-10,-1] 
Freq.: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.879, Z = -0.153, W = 92.5, U = 47.5; Avg. Mann-
Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.196, Z = -1.292, W = 98.5, U = 32.5; [0] Freq.: Mann-Whitney 
U, two-tailed, p = 0.887, Z = -0.189, W = 147, U = 69; Avg.: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p 
= 0.950, Z = -0.063, W = 149, U = 71; [1,10] Freq.: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.776, Z 
= -0.284, W = 91, U = 46; Avg.: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.626, Z = -0.487, W = 
109.5, U = 43.5; [11,20] Freq.: Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.542, Z = -0.609, W = 87, 
U = 42; Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.239, Z = -1.177, W = 101, U = 35). To sum up, 
significant differences in punishment behavior between both session types exist. Namely, both 
frequency  of  punishment  and  average  height  of  punishment  are  higher  in  the  punishment 
treatment  of  PU_NP  sessions  than  in  the  punishment  treatment  of  NP_PU  sessions.  We 
attribute this result to a harsher line of action against strong unsocial behavior in PU_NP 
sessions than in NP_PU sessions. 
   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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(a) Height of punishment costs   (b) Relative frequency of punishment  
 
Figure 2: Height and frequency of punishment by relative contribution: This figure illustrates the height (a) and frequency (b) of punishment 
separated by the difference between a participants contribution and the contribution of the corresponding group member. E.g., the interval [-
20,-11] indicates that the participants contribution lie between 11 and 20 tokens higher than the contribution of the group member and the 
interval [0] gathers all case with equal contributions. 
 
Finally, we investigate the development of punishment over time (see Figure 3). As the figure 
illustrates  punishment  costs  are  relatively  stable  throughout  the  experiment,  while  they 
increase in the last period of the NP_PU session (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test – 9x Period 10 
>  Period  9,  1x  Period  10  <  Period  9,  2x  Period  10  =  Period  9,  p  =  0.017,  Z  =  -2.397). 
Punishment costs of the PU_NP sessions do not increase in the last period (Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test – 9x Period 10 > Period 9, 2x Period 10 < Period 9, 1x Period 10 = Period 9, p = 
0.141, Z = -1.471). 
 
Session No Punishment – Punishment  Session Punishment – No Punishment 
   
Figure 3: Development of average deduction costs per participant with 95% confidence interval: The dotted lines show the average costs for 
punishment  per  session  type.  The  lines  without  dots  stand  for  the  95%  confidence  intervals  of  the  corresponding  data  points.  While 
punishment costs remain stable throughout the experiment, costs increase in the last period.  
 
Contributions: After we have shown, that punishment behavior is significantly different in 
NP_PU sessions and PU_NP sessions, we now investigate the contributions of the participants 














1	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐6.0	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐4.0	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.0	 ﾠ 0.0	 ﾠ 2.0	 ﾠ
NP_PU	 ﾠ
PU_NP	 ﾠ






[-ﾭ‐10,-ﾭ‐1]	 ﾠ [-ﾭ‐20,-ﾭ‐11]	 ﾠ [0]	 ﾠ [1,10]	 ﾠ [11,20]	 ﾠ
NP_PU	 ﾠ PU_NP	 ﾠ  KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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= 0.039, Z = -1.790, W = 119, U = 41) and Treatment Punishment (Mann-Whitney U, one-
tailed, p = 0.049, Z = -1.965, W = 116, U = 38), have higher contributions in the NP_PU 
sessions, than in the PU_NP sessions. 
 
When investigating the temporal development of contributions over time (see  



































     
 



































     
Figure 4), we only find end game behavior in the punishment treatment of the PU_NP sessions 
(Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test – 2x Period 10 > Period 9, 8x Period 10 < Period 9, 2x Period 10 
= Period 9, p = 0.016, Z = -2.41), while we find no end game behavior in any other treatment 
(NP_PU, Punishment: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test – 3x Period 10 > Period 9, 9x Period 10 < 
Period 9, 3x Period 10 = Period 9, p = 0.120, Z = -1.554; NP_PU, No Punishment: Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test – 4x Period 10 > Period 9, 4x Period 10 < Period 9, 4x Period 10 = Period 9, 
p = 0.944, Z = -0.070; PU_NP, No Punishment: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test – 3x Period 10 > 
Period 9, 6x Period 10 < Period 9, 3x Period 10 = Period 9, p = 0.192, Z = -1.304). Notice in 
both punishment treatments participants show end game behavior. While in sessions NP_PU 
such end game behavior is characterized by an increase of punishment in the last period, it 
results  in  decreased  contributions  in  sessions  PU_NP.  For  both  treatments  without 
punishment, we do not observe such behavior. 
 
Table 2: Average contribution and standard deviation of contributions per group: This table shows the average contribution per group and 
treatment  and  the  standard  deviation  of  the  contributions.  As  already  mentioned  when  describing  punishment  behavior,  the  average 
contribution in three groups (5, 8, 11) of Treatment Punishment in NP_PU sessions is 20. Aside this, contributions are higher in NP_PU 
sessions than in PU_NP sessions. 
Group	 ﾠ
Punishment	 ﾠ No	 ﾠPunishment	 ﾠ
NP_PU	 ﾠ PU_NP	 ﾠ NP_PU	 ﾠ PU_NP	 ﾠ
Avg.	 ﾠ S.D.	 ﾠ Avg.	 ﾠ S.D.	 ﾠ Avg.	 ﾠ S.D.	 ﾠ Avg.	 ﾠ S.D.	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠ 19.43	 ﾠ 2.23	 ﾠ 17.15	 ﾠ 6.17	 ﾠ 5.43	 ﾠ 6.20	 ﾠ 1.75	 ﾠ 4.63	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠ 18.43	 ﾠ 5.33	 ﾠ 15.65	 ﾠ 7.13	 ﾠ 6.88	 ﾠ 9.38	 ﾠ 7.63	 ﾠ 8.95	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠ 17.98	 ﾠ 6.07	 ﾠ 17.20	 ﾠ 5.41	 ﾠ 7.18	 ﾠ 7.43	 ﾠ 7.33	 ﾠ 8.78	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠ 19.55	 ﾠ 2.04	 ﾠ 8.48	 ﾠ 6.54	 ﾠ 7.90	 ﾠ 7.87	 ﾠ 0.45	 ﾠ 1.36	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ 20.00	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ 12.80	 ﾠ 8.49	 ﾠ 18.63	 ﾠ 4.93	 ﾠ 3.88	 ﾠ 7.30	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ 19.43	 ﾠ 3.19	 ﾠ 10.68	 ﾠ 5.94	 ﾠ 9.25	 ﾠ 6.85	 ﾠ 12.93	 ﾠ 7.07	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠ 14.50	 ﾠ 5.97	 ﾠ 18.68	 ﾠ 4.08	 ﾠ 5.25	 ﾠ 7.16	 ﾠ 2.68	 ﾠ 5.22	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠ 20.00	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ 19.75	 ﾠ 1.58	 ﾠ 16.60	 ﾠ 7.12	 ﾠ 7.23	 ﾠ 8.99	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠ 15.98	 ﾠ 8.09	 ﾠ 18.88	 ﾠ 3.84	 ﾠ 5.15	 ﾠ 8.51	 ﾠ 7.53	 ﾠ 7.10	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠ 18.10	 ﾠ 3.97	 ﾠ 19.13	 ﾠ 3.90	 ﾠ 7.60	 ﾠ 7.00	 ﾠ 5.00	 ﾠ 8.77	 ﾠ  KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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11	 ﾠ 20.00	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ 18.58	 ﾠ 3.66	 ﾠ 5.60	 ﾠ 8.49	 ﾠ 4.98	 ﾠ 6.04	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠ 17.63	 ﾠ 5.80	 ﾠ 8.30	 ﾠ 7.39	 ﾠ 4.08	 ﾠ 6.84	 ﾠ 3.28	 ﾠ 5.04	 ﾠ
All	 ﾠ 18.42	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 15.44	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 8.30	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 5.39	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ
 
Analyzing contributions in the first period shows significant differences between NP_PU and 
PU_NP  sessions  in  the  treatments  without  punishment  (Mann-Whitney  U,  two-tailed,  p  = 
0.033, Z = -2.135, W = 2054, U = 878). These differences are not visible in the first period of 
the punishment treatment (Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.189, Z = -1.315, W = 2173.5, U 
=  997.5).  In  addition,  in  NP_PU  sessions  the  contribution  in  the  first  period  of  the  No 
Punishment treatment determines both the average contribution in the whole No Punishment 
treatments (Anova, p = 0.026, F = 6.823) and the subsequent Punishment treatment (Anova, p 
= 0.047, F = 5.138). This is different for the PU_NP session. Here, contributions are a good 
predictor for the punishment treatment (Anova, p = 0.001, F = 23.220), while no correlation 
between contributions in the first period of the Punishment Treatment and the No Punishment 
Treatment exists (Anova, p = 0.876, F = 0.026). 
 
The results concerning contributions are especially interesting, when compared to experiments 
with gains. The height of cooperation in experiments over gains lies bellow the lower bound of 
the 95% confidence interval of the height of cooperation in the Punishment Treatment in 
NP_PU sessions. Accordingly upper bound of the corresponding 95% confidence interval in in 
No  Punishment  Treatments  in  the  PU_NP  session  lies  most  periods  bellow  the  height  of 
cooperation in the treatments without punishment over gains. 
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Figure 4: Development of average contributions per participant with 95% confidence interval:  These figures show the development of 
average contributions over time (dotted lines). According to existing investigations, in treatments with punishment ((b) and (c)) contributions 
tend to be stable over time, while they decrease in treatments without punishment ((a) and (d)). In contrast to existing investigations, 95% 
confidence intervals (lines without dots) of the treatment with punishment in NP_PU sessions tends to be narrower than the corresponding 
95% confidence interval of the PU_NP sessions. In addition contributions in NP_PU sessions are higher than in PU_NP sessions for both 
treatments. 
 
Income: Both punishment costs are higher in PU_NP sessions than in NP_PU sessions, while 
at the same time contributions in PU_NP sessions are lower than in NP_PU sessions. This 
results in clear differences between the incomes of a participant in a PU_NP session and in a 
NP_PU session (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Average income and standard deviation of income per group: This table shows both the average income and the standard deviation of 
incomes per group. While for NP_PU sessions the income on average is higher in the punishment treatment, it is not for the PU_NP sessions. 
Group	 ﾠ







Punishment	 ﾠ–	 ﾠNo	 ﾠ
Punishment	 ﾠ
Avg.	 ﾠ S.D.	 ﾠ Avg.	 ﾠ S.D.	 ﾠ Avg.	 ﾠ S.D.	 ﾠ Avg.	 ﾠ S.D.	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐4.45	 ﾠ 4.15	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐16.77	 ﾠ 13.16	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐8.75	 ﾠ 5.68	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐10.95	 ﾠ 4.13	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐4.25	 ﾠ 6.26	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐15.31	 ﾠ 10.35	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐7.88	 ﾠ 8.62	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐7.43	 ﾠ 8.45	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐7.23	 ﾠ 9.39	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐9.36	 ﾠ 8.63	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐7.70	 ﾠ 6.33	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐7.60	 ﾠ 7.58	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.77	 ﾠ 3.68	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐21.24	 ﾠ 6.74	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐7.26	 ﾠ 6.67	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐11.73	 ﾠ 1.28	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ 0.00	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐25.90	 ﾠ 11.72	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.83	 ﾠ 4.62	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐9.67	 ﾠ 6.98	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.12	 ﾠ 6.12	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐23.43	 ﾠ 10.71	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐6.45	 ﾠ 4.98	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐4.24	 ﾠ 5.85	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐4.90	 ﾠ 4.91	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐4.19	 ﾠ 5.17	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐8.85	 ﾠ 6.72	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐10.40	 ﾠ 4.43	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.30	 ﾠ 0.91	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.25	 ﾠ 2.48	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.04	 ﾠ 5.64	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐7.67	 ﾠ 7.73	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐11.57	 ﾠ 11.76	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐3.68	 ﾠ 5.20	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐8.91	 ﾠ 6.96	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐7.48	 ﾠ 5.95	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐10.91	 ﾠ 10.12	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.93	 ﾠ 6.84	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐7.44	 ﾠ 6.60	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐9.00	 ﾠ 7.57	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.10	 ﾠ 0.50	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐5.26	 ﾠ 6.35	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐8.64	 ﾠ 7.50	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐9.01	 ﾠ 5.33	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐11.13	 ﾠ 9.95	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐39.60	 ﾠ 10.82	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐9.56	 ﾠ 5.41	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐10.04	 ﾠ 4.47	 ﾠ
All	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐4.98	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐14.08	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐7.03	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐8.77	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ
 
The  income  of  the  participants  in  the  No  Punishment  Treatment  is  higher  in  the  NP_PU 
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= 119, U = 41), the same holds for the income in the Punishment Treatment (Mann-Whitney 
U, two-tailed, p = 0.043, Z = -2.021, W = 115, U = 37). 
 
Next, we calculate the ratio between income in the Punishment Treatment per period and the 
income per period in the treatment without punishment for both session types (see Figure 5). 
This ratio is an important indicator for the utility of a punishment mechanism: If the ratio is 
higher than 1, this implies that the punishment mechanism pays, while a value smaller than 1 
hints that punishing is not beneficial at all. The analysis shows that while punishment pays in 
almost all periods of the NP_PU sessions, it never pays in the PU_NP sessions. 
 
In experiments with gains, punishment pays in the last few periods, while it does not pay 
throughout  the  experiment.  This  contrasts  the  results  in  experiments  with  losses.  Here, 
depending on the sequence of treatments punishment pays or not. 
 
Summary: An experimental comparison of the Public Loss Game clearly shows order effects 
when playing the Punishment before instead of after the No Punishment Treatment. Both 
punishment costs are higher, while contributions and income are lower, if the participants have 
no chance of punishing in the second treatment. Although our experiments only last for 10 
periods, in the experiments punishment pays. Contrasting comparable results concerning gains 
[9]. 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of incomes in both treatments separated by session types: This figure shows the ratio between income per period in the 
Punishment Treatment and income per period in the No Punishment Treatment. Values above 1 imply that punishment pays in the respective 
period, while values are below 1 if the ratio is smaller than 1. For the PU_NP sessions the ratio never exceeds 1, while it is above 1 in most 
periods of the NP_PU sessions (except for period 1, 2 and 10). 
 
Discussion  Our  results  clearly  support  direct  and  indirect  reciprocity  as  justification  for 
cooperative behavior. The high degrees of cooperation in the treatment without punishment 
lead to high degrees of cooperation in the treatment with punishment, if played in this order. 
The contrary holds when the sequence of treatments is changed. Aside this, the results cast 
serious  doubt  on  any  fairness  or  inequality  aversion  [1,  6]  related  justification.  If  such  a 
justification was adequate the restart should have no impact on the behavior of the other 
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cooperative  behavior  of  others.  Without  such  experiences,  and  the  willingness  to  behave 
reciprocally punishment only yields increased losses. 
 
We  deem  the  high  degrees  of  cooperation,  we  currently  observe  across  country  to  be 
reciprocal behavior for cooperation of nations currently struggling.  
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In this appendix, we present the experimental instructions and procedures used during our 
experiments. We focus our presentation on the sessions in which we conducted the treatment 
without punishment before the treatments with punishment. We adopted these instructions and 
procedures for the other sequence of treatments accordingly. As instructions and procedures, 
we adapted the corresponding documents described in the “Supporting Online Material”, of 
the  paper  “Antisocial  Punishment  Across  Societies”  by  Herrmann  et  al.  (Herrmann  et  al. 
2008).  The  instructions  published  were  written  in  English,  hence  we  translated  them  to 
German for our experiments, and translated them back to English for this appendix. 
1. Experiment Design 
Conducting experiments with losses is slightly different compared to experiments over gains. 
Therefore,  after  describing  our  treatments,  we  introduce  the  procedure  for  recruiting  the 
participants of our sessions with a focus on differences to standard experiments over gains, 
before we describe the experimental procedure. 
1.1. Treatments 
We conducted two treatments with all participants of our experiments. In the Treatment No 
Punishment  (NP)  participants  played  a  Public  Good  Game  for  10  periods  in  groups  of  4 
participants. The parameterization of the experiment followed Fehr and Gächter [3] which has 
been  used  in  several  subsequent  studies  (see  e.g.,  [14]).  Namely,  participants  received  an 
endowment of 20 tokens to distribute. Every token kept for oneself resulted in a payoff of 1 
Experimental Currency Unit (ECU), while a token contributed to the public good yielded 0.4 
ECU per group member. In contrast to Fehr and Gächter all participants received a period loss 
of 32 ECU (the payoff each participant earned if all group members showed full cooperation) 
in  the  beginning  of  each  period.  The  Treatment  Punishment  (PU)  was  identical  to  the 
Treatment  No  Punishment  except  that  we  added  a  punishment  stage  after  the  participants 
made their decisions. During the punishment stage participants first saw the contributions of 
their group members in random order and could decide whether to punish a participant or not. 
Participants  could  punish  each  group  member  with  0  to  10  deduction  points,  costing 
themselves 1 ECU per deduction point and the punished group member 3 ECU per deduction 
point. In the end of the experiment, we transferred the payoff in ECU to a payoff in € by 
multiplying it with 0.025. 
1.2. Conduction of Sessions 
We recruited our participants using ORSEE [10] from various disciplines at the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology. Within the invitation, we informed the participants that they had to 
come to the final experiment and to an additional appointed time for receiving instructions at 
least  two  weeks  before  the  experiment.  During  the  additional  appointment,  we  paid  the 
participants  their  show  up  fee  without  giving  any  further  information  concerning  the 




We  conducted  all  experiments  at  the  networked  laboratories  of  the  Karlsruhe  Institute  of 
Technology. In this laboratory all participants are separated to ensure anonymity. The software 
used throughout the experiments was zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
 
To minimize the impact of the experimenter, we conducted all sessions with the same team of 
two student assistants. Both student assistants did not have knowledge of the literature on 
public goods before the end of the last session, nor did we discuss our expectations concerning 
the experiment with them. To further standardize the procedure, the student assistants resorted 
to written guidelines when conducting the experiment.  
 
In each out of 6 sessions, 16 participants (4 groups) took part. In sum 96 participants attended 
one of our sessions. To ensure that enough participants arrived at the final experiment, we 
recruited some additional participants. The loss in participants corresponds to the average 
fraction of participants we lose per experiment of this size in Karlsruhe. All participants who 
received their show up fee during the instructions, but did not attend the session returned the 
show up fee to the experimenter during the days after the session. With participants who 
attended the session, but could not participate in the experiment, we conducted a lottery during 
which they could lose part of their show up fee. This lottery will not be evaluated in the 
remainder of this paper. 
 
After the experiment ended, the participants paid their lost money to the experimenter. We 
gave participants who had no money with them an additional date for payback, if they had not 
enough money with them. The slowest participant to pay his money returned it four days after 
the session, the majority of participants returned it the same or the following day.  
2. Experimental Procedure 
In the beginning of each session, we randomly assigned participants to seats in the laboratory. 
Afterwards, participants read the instructions and answered several control questions to ensure 
that  they  understood  the  experiment.  After  the  control  questions  we  summarized  the 
instructions making them common knowledge among all participants. Then the participants 
played  the  first  treatment.  After  the  first  treatment,  we  conducted  a  second  treatment 
introduced  by  additional  instructions  and  control  questions.  After  the  second  treatment, 
participants answered a short questionnaire concerning their perception of the game, before we 
paid all participants in private.  
 
Between the sessions, we varied the sequence of treatments. Namely, we played 3 sessions 
with  Treatment  Punishment  following  Treatment  No  Punishment  (Session  Type  NP_PU), 
while we changed the order for 3 other experiments (Session Type PU_NP) (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Number of sessions, groups and participants per session type 
  Sessions  Groups  Participants 
No Punishment, Punishment (NP_PU)  3  12  48 
Punishment, No Punishment (PU_NP)  3  12  48 
Sum  6  24  96 




Two weeks before each session all participants received a show up fee of 13.00 €. This show 
up fee consisted of the default show up fee in Karlsruhe of 5.00 € plus additional 8.00 €. 
Given  all  participants  showed  full  cooperation  during  all  periods  each  participant  would 
receive exactly 8.00 € for participation. In this way we ensured that all participants of one 
group could reach a payoff during the treatments of 0.00 € for full cooperation, while at least 
one participant received a loss when deviating. In addition all participants received 0.625 € (25 
ECU)  in  the  beginning  of  each  punishment  treatment.  These  payoff  rules  have  another 
advantage: As we used the same transfer rate between ECU and € as Herrmann et al. did 
(Herrmann et al., 2008) in experiments in Germany, a group showing the same behavior in our 
experiments as in the experiments of Herrmann et al. received the same gains and losses for 
contributions and punishment in our experiments as in their experiments. The average payoff 
per participant including the show up fee was 9.53 € (NP_PU Sessions: 10.70 €; PU_NP 
Sessions: 7.96 €) with a minimum of -1.30 € (NP_PU Sessions: 7.70 €; PU_NP Sessions: -
1.30 €) and a maximum of 13.70 € (NP_PU Sessions: 13.70 €; PU_NP Sessions: 12.70 €) 
respectively. On average the experiments lasted 1:23 hours (instructions + control questions: 
49 minutes, treatments: 34 minutes). 
 
The  remainder  of  this  section  presents  the  protocol  the  student  assistants  followed  when 
conducting the experiment. 
2.1. Preparation of the experiment 
•  Before the experiment start up all computers in the laboratory (zLeafs) and the server 
(zTree)  
•  Distribute instructions with the back of the instructions facing up 
•  Prepare cards with computer numbers in the lab, so that participants can be randomly 
allocated to computers. 
2.2. Welcoming outside the lab 
•  “Hello, we are glad that you participate in our experiment. You will learn in the lab 
what the experiment is about.” 
•  “You are randomly assigned to seats in the lab. Please draw a number and take a seat 
on the corresponding place in the lab.“ 
 
We conducted all experiments with 16 participants per session. Therefore, we invited and paid 
off additional participants to ensure that every session consisted of at least 16 participants. If 
more than 16 participants showed up, we let only the first 16 participants draw a number. With 
all remaining participants, we played another decision experiment. We chose this procedure, 
instead of asking participants whether they wanted to leave voluntarily as we deem it to result 
in more “random” subject groups. 
2.3. Introduction in the lab 
•  “Thank you for coming. You will learn from the instructions we have distributed to 
your computer place what the experiment is about. Before we start the experiment, we 
want to point out that communication is not allowed throughout the experiment.”   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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•  “At  the  end  of  the  instructions,  you  will  find  control  questions.  Answering  these 
questions is no exam. The questions are meant to ensure that you understood how the 
earnings of the experiment are calculated. Please start reading the instructions.” 
2.4. After answering the control questions of the No Punishment Treatment 
•  “All participants have answered the control questions correctly. Before we start with 
the experiment, we summarize it.” 
•  “As you know, you interact in this experiment with three other group members. The 
experiment lasts for 10 periods. During all periods you are in the same group. Every 
period, you have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to a 
project and how many you want to keep for yourself. Please be aware that you cannot 
transfer any tokens to the next period. In each period you start with an endowment of 
20 tokens. You make your decision about the contribution to the project by entering 
the amount of your contribution in the input dialog.” 
•  “When all four group members have made their decisions, a result screen will appear. 
The result screen lists your contribution to the project, the total sum of contributions of 
all four group members to the project, your earnings from retained tokens and your 
income from the income.” 
•  “The income of retained tokens is the difference between 20 and your contribution to 
the project. Your income from the project is calculated as 0.4 times the total sum of the 
contributions of all four group members to the project.” 
•  “After the result screen was shown, the so called information screen will appear. On 
this screen, you will find a table. In the first column your contribution to the project 
(absolute and in %) is listed. In the other columns the contributions of all other group 
members are listed in a randomly chosen order.” 
•  “Do you have any questions?” 
2.5. Conduction of the No Punishment Treatment 
Participants take their decisions undisturbed and unobserved by the experimenters, who only 
observe the experiment by monitoring the software. 
2.6. After Conduction of the No Punishment Treatment 
•  “The experiment is now finished. Another experiment follows that lasts 10 periods as 
well. After this, the entire experiment is finished. You will then have to answer a short 
questionnaire and will then get paid.” 
•  “We will now distribute the instructions for the next 10 periods.” 
2.7. After answering the control questions of the Punishment Treatment 
•  “The second experiment differs from the previous experiment. We have introduced a 
second stage. Please see Fig. 4 of the instructions. There you find the input dialog of 
the second stage. This dialog is similar to the information dialog, you know from the 
first experiment.” 
•  “New in this two-stage experiment is the possibility for you to assign deduction points 
(between 0 and -10) to the other group members. One deduction point costs you 1 ECU   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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and reduces the income of the group member to whom you assign the deduction point 
by 3 ECU.” 
•  “If you assign deduction points, you have to put a negative sign in front of the number. 
This  two-stage  experiment  will  be  repeated  10  times  with  the  same  people  in  the 
group.” 
•  “Do you have any questions?” 
2.8. Conduction of the Punishment Treatment 
Participants take their decisions undisturbed and unobserved by the experimenters, who only 
observe the experiment by monitoring the software. 
 
2.9. After Conduction of the Punishment Treatment 
•  “The  second  experiment  is  now  finished.  Please  answer  the  questions  in  our 
questionnaire. After this, we will pay you in private.” 
 
After answering the questionnaire all participants are paid in private and the experiment ends. 
3. Translated Experimental Instructions 
In  this  section  we  present  an  English  translation  of  the  instructions  used  throughout  our 
experiments. Compared to the instructions in Herrmann et al. (Herrmann et al. 2008), we made 
the following changes: 
•  The first four sections until the start of the description of the experiment were changed 
according to the first sections typically used in experiments conducted at the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology.  
•  We replaced the term “guilder” in the original by “ECU” to resemble the wording 
typically used at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. 
•  We corrected three typos in the original instructions. There, some examples describing 
the conversion of tokens to guilders, or ECU, in error specified tokens as unit of the 
result instead of the experimental currency.  
•  We changed the instructions to introduce the period loss. 
Aside these changes, we stuck to the original instructions as close as possible.  
3.1. No Punishment Treatment 
Welcome to this experiment and thank you very much for your participation. You received € 
13.00  for  participation  in  this  experiment.  These  earnings  can  increase  or  decrease  in  the 
following depending on your own decisions and the decisions of your fellow players. Please 
read these instructions – which are the same for all – carefully. To ensure that you understand 
the  instructions,  please  answer  the  control  questions  after  reading  the  instructions.  These 
control questions are displayed at your computer terminal as soon as you confirmed reading 
the instructions there. 
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Please remain calm and switch of your mobile phones. Communication among the participants 
is not allowed. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will than 
come to you and answer your question in private. If you do not follow these Instructions, we 
have  to  suspend  you  from  the  experiment.  You  then  have  to  return  all  payments  for 
participation. 
 
Your payoff during the experiment depends on your decisions as well as the decisions of other 
participants. Your earnings will be calculated in experimental currency units (ECU) during the 
experiment. At the end of the experiment your entire earnings will be converted to Euro. The 
conversion rate is: 
 
1 experimental currency unit (ECU) = 0.025 Euro 
 
Every period consists of one stage. In the beginning of each period, you receive a loss of -32 
ECU. In addition you receive 20 tokens. In the remainder we call this your endowment. Your 
task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens 
you contribute to a project and how many of them to keep for yourself. The consequences of 
your decision are explained in detail below. At the beginning of each period the following 
input dialog for the first stage will appear (see Fig. 1: Input Dialog). 
 
We will account your earnings with you at the end of the experiment. You will be paid in 
private to ensure that no other participant learns your payoff. 
 
Course of the Experiment 
 
The experiment is divided into 10 separate periods. In each period the participants are divided 
into groups of 4. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. The composition 
to groups of 4 will stay the same for the 10 periods of the experiment. In the following pages 
we describe the experiment in detail. 
 
The period number appears in the top left corner of the input dialog. In the upper right corner 
you see how many more seconds remain for your decision. You will have 90 seconds in the 
first two periods and60 seconds in the remaining periods. Your decision must be made within 
the time limit. 
 
Your endowment in each period is 20 tokens. You have to decide how many tokens you want 
to contribute to the project by typing a number between 0 and 20 in the input field. This field 
is reached by clicking it with the mouse. As soon as you have decided how many tokens to 
contribute, you have also decided how many tokens to keep for yourself: This is (20 – your 
contribution) token. After entering your contribution you must click the “OK”-Button. Once 
you have done this, your decision can no longer be revised. 
 
After all members of your group have made their decisions the following screen will show you 
the total amount of tokens contributed by all four group members to the project (including   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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your contribution) (see Fig. 2: Result Screen). This screen also shows you how many ECU 
you have earned during the first stage.  
Your income consists of three parts: 
 
(1) The period loss, which you received in the beginning of the period. 
Period Loss = -32 ECU 
 
(2) The tokens, which you kept for yourself (“Income from retained tokens”) with: 
1 token = 1 ECU 
 
(3) The “Income from the project”. This income is calculated as follows: 
Income from the project = 0.4 x total contributions to the project 
 
Your income in ECU of a period is therefore: 
-32 
+ (20- “Ihr Beitrag zum Projekt”) 
+ 0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project 
 
Fig. 1: Input Dialog 
 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, i.e. each 
group member receives the same income from the project. Assume, for example, that the sum 
of the contributions to the project 60 tokens. In this case each member of the group receives an   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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income from the project of: 0.4 x 60 = 24 ECU. If the total contribution to the project is 9 
tokens, then you and all other members of the group receive an income of 0.4 x 9 = 3.6 ECU 
from the project. 
 
Fig. 2: Result Screen 
 
 
For each token, which you keep for yourself, you earn an income of 1 ECU. Suppose you 
contributed this token to the project instead, then the total contribution to the project would 
rise by one token. Your income from the project would rise by 0.4 x 1 = 0.4 ECU. However, 
the income of all other group members would also rise by 0.4 ECU, so that the total income of 
the  group  from  the  project  would  increase  by  1.6  ECU.  Your  contribution  to  the  project 
therefore also raises the income of the other group members. On the other hand, you earn an 
income  for  each  token  contributed  by  the  other  members  to  the  project.  For  each  token 
contributed by any group member you earn 0.4 x 1 = 0.4 ECU. 
 
In the first two periods you have 45 seconds and in the remaining periods 30 seconds to view 
your income. If you are finished before the time is up, please click the “Continue”-Button. 
 
Next, the information screen appears, which reveals the contributions of the individual group 




This screen shows how much each member of the group contributed to the project. Your 
contribution is displayed in blue in the first column, while the contributions of the other group 
members are shown in the remaining three columns. Please note that the order in which the 
contributions  of  the  other  players  are  displayed  is  changed  randomly  in  each  period.  The 
contribution in the second column, for example, in general stems always from a different 
group member. The same holds for the contributions in the other columns. Beside the absolute 
contributions, the contributions as a percentage of the endowment are also displayed. 
  
In the first two periods you have 45 seconds and in the remaining periods 30 seconds to view 
your income. If you are finished before the time is up, please click the “Continue”-Button. 
 
Fig. 3: Information Screen 
 
3.2. Punishment Treatment 
Course of the Experiment 
 
We now repeat the experiment and introduce some changes. Each participant receives a lump-
sum payment of 25 ECU at the beginning of the experiment. This payment can be used to pay   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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for additional losses during the experiment. At the end of the subsequent ten periods the whole 
experiment is finished and you receive: 
 
   Your income from the first 10 periods  
+ Your income from the second 10 periods  
    (including the lump-sum payment of 25 ECU)  
= Total sum of ECU 
 
This experiment consists of two stages in each period and altogether there are 10 periods. The 
first stage is identical to the previous experiment. At the first stage you to decide how many 
tokens out of 20 you would like to contribute to a project (and hence you decide with it how 
many tokens you keep for yourself). Your income from the first stage is calculated exactly in 
the same way as in the previous experiment. 
 
For each token you keep for yourself, you earn an income of 1 ECU. For any token you 
contribute to the project, you and all other group members will earn 0.4 ECU. Therefore, each 
token that another group member contributes to the project will increase your income by 0.4 
ECU. 
 
Differences in the New Experiment 
 
Now there is a second stage introduced that follows the display of the result screen at the end 
of the first stage. 
 
The Second Stage 
 
At the second stage you see how many tokens each of the other group members contributed to 
the project. In addition, in this stage you can decrease the income of each other group member 
by assigning deduction points. Alternatively you can leave the income unchanged. The other 
group members can also decrease your income if they wish to. This is apparent from the input 
screen at the second stage (see Fig. 4: Input Dialog of the Second Stage). 
 
You now have to decide whether, and if so, how many deduction points to assign to each of 
the other three group members. In any case you must enter a number for each of them. If you 
do not wish to change the income of a specific group member then you must enter 0. If you 
want  to  distribute  deduction  points,  you  must  put  a  negative  sign  in  front  of  the  number 
(without spaces between them). 
 
For  this  decision  you  have  180  seconds  in  the  first  two  periods  and  120  seconds  in  the 
remaining periods. You can move from one input field to the other by pressing the tab-key or 
by using the mouse. 
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If  you  distribute  deduction  points,  you  have  costs  in  ECU  that  depend  on  the  amount  of 
deduction  points  you  distribute.  You  can  assign  between  -10  and  0  points  to  each  group 
member. The larger the amount of deduction points that you assign, the larger your costs. The 
following formula indicates the relationship between the number of assigned points and the 
costs of assigning points: 
 
Costs of assigning deduction points = Sum of assigned deduction points 
 
Fig. 4: Input Dialog of the Second Stage 
 
 
Every assigned deduction point costs you 1 ECU. For example, if you assign 2 deduction 
points to one member, this costs you 2 ECU; if, in addition, you assign 9 deduction points to 
another member this costs you 9 Guilders. If you assign 0 points to the last group member this 
has  no  cost  for  you.  In  total  you  have  assigned  11  deduction  points  and  your  total  costs 
therefore amount to 11 (=2+9+0) ECU. 
 
You can determine the total cost on the computer. To perform the calculation you have to 
click the button “Calculation” (see Fig. 4: Input Dialog of the Second Stage). You can do this 
after you have entered the deduction points. On the screen you will see the total costs of your   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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assigned points. As long as you have not yet clicked the “OK”-button, you can change your 
decision (within the remaining time). To recalculate the costs after a change of your assigned 
points, press the “Calculation”-button again. 
 
If you assign 0 points to a particular group member (i.e., you enter “0”), you will not alter his 
income. If you assign one deduction point to a group member (i.e., you enter “–1”) you will 
decrease  the  income  of  this  group  member  by  3  ECU.  If  you  assign  a  group  member  2 
deduction points (i.e., you enter “–2”), you will decrease the income of the group member by 6 
ECU, and so on. Each deduction point that you assign to another group member will reduce 
his or her income by 3 ECU. 
 
Whether or by how much the income at the second stage is decreased in total depends on the 
total  of  the  received  deduction  points.  If  somebody,  for  instance,  receives  a  total  of  3 
deduction points (from all other group members in this period), his or her income is decreased 
by 9 ECU. If somebody receives a total of 4 deduction points, his or her income is reduced by 
12 ECU. Your total income from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows: 
 
Total Income (in ECU) at the end of the second stage = income of the period 
 
= Income from the first stage (1) 
- 3 x Number of received deduction points 
(2) 
- Costs for distributing deduction points 
 ﾠup ﾠto ﾠ-ﾭ‐32 ﾠ(= ﾠperiod ﾠloss) 
 
If your income at the first stage (1) minus three times the received deduction points (2) is less 
than your period loss (= -32), then you only loose the period loss (-32). Please note, that in the 
end of the second stage your income in ECU can be less than the period loss (-32), if the costs 
of your assigned deduction points exceed your income from the first stage minus the income 
reduction by the received deduction points. You can, however, avoid losses larger than the 
period loss (-32) with certainty through your own decisions! 
 
After all participants have made their decision, your income from the period will be displayed 
on the following screen (see Fig. 5: Income Screen at the End of the Second Stage). 
 
In the first two periods you have 45 seconds and in the remaining periods 30 seconds to view 
your income. If you are finished before the time is up, please click the “Continue”-Button. 
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Fig. 5: Income Screen at the End of the Second Stage 
4. Control Questions 
After  reading  the  experimental  instructions,  we  asked  the  answer  control  questions.  We 
showed the control questions to the participants using an zTree program (Fischbacher, 2007). 
We show the correct results in brackets [] behind the questions. Compared to the control 
questions of Herrmann et al. (Herrmann et al., 2008), we made the following changes: 
•  We specified the unit of the results (ECU) after the control questions. 
•  Question (6) was abbreviated in the original, as (Herrmann et al., 2008) presented the 
control  questions  on  paper.  In  our  experiments,  we  repeated  the  complete  control 
question, as the participants could not see the control questions after answering them 
correctly. 
•  Question (9) replaces the corresponding question of Herrmann et al. as the original 
question was misleading after the introduction of the period loss. 
4.1. No Punishment Treatment 
(1) Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose nobody (including you) 
contributes any tokens to the project. What is: 
a.  Your income (in ECU): [-12] 
b.  The income of all other group members (in ECU): -12   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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(2) Every group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose you contribute 20 tokens to 
the project. All other group members each contribute 20 tokens to the project. What is: 
a.  Your income (in ECU): [0] 
b.  The income of all other group members (in ECU): [0] 
(3) Every  group  member  has  an  endowment  of  20  tokens.  Suppose  the  other  three  group 
members contribute a total of 30 tokens to the project. What is: 
a.  Your income (in ECU), if you contribute 0 tokens to the project: [0] 
b.  Your income (in ECU), if you contribute 15 tokens to the project: [-9] 
(4) Every group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose you contribute 8 tokens to 
the project. What is: 
a.  Your income (in ECU), if all other group members together contribute a total of 7 
tokens to the project: [-14] 
b.  Your income (in ECU), if all other group members together contribute a total of 22 
tokens to the project: [-8] 
4.2. Punishment Treatment 
(5) Suppose at the second stage you assign the following deduction points to your three other 
group members: -9, -5, 0. What are the total costs (in ECU) of your assigned deduction 
points? [-14] 
(6) Suppose at the second stage you assign the following deduction points to your three other 
group members: 0, 0, 0. What are the total costs (in ECU) of your assigned deduction 
points? [0] 
(7) By how many ECU will your income from the first stage be changed, if you receive a total 
of 0 deduction points from the other group members? [0] 
(8) By how many ECU will your income from the first stage be changed, if you receive a total 
of 4 deduction points from your group members? [-12] 
(9) What is the height of your income (in ECU), if you receive a total of 15 deduction points 
from you group members, but du not distribute any deduction points your own? [-32] 
5. Original Instructions 
In  the  remainder  of  this  section,  we  present  the  original  German  instructions  as  used 
throughout the experiments. We omit the original control questions and procedures. They are 
available upon request. 
5.1. No Punishment Treatment 
Herzlich  willkommen  zu  diesem  Experiment  und  vielen  Dank  für  Ihre  Teilnahme.  Sie 
erhielten bereits 13,00 Euro für die Teilnahme an diesem Experiment. Diese Auszahlung kann 
sich im Folgenden abhängig von Ihren eigenen Entscheidungen und den Entscheidungen der 
Mitspieler verringern. Bitte lesen Sie daher diese Anweisungen – die für alle gleich sind – 
sorgfältig durch. Um sicherzugehen, dass Sie die Instruktionen verstanden haben, beantworten 
Sie  bitte  im  Anschluss  an  das  Lesen  der  Anleitung  einige  Kontrollfragen.  Diese   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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Kontrollfragen  werden  Ihnen  am  Computer-Terminal  angezeigt,  sobald  Sie  das  Lesen  der 
Anleitung dort bestätigt haben. 
 
Bitte  verhalten  Sie  sich  ruhig  und  schalten  Sie  Ihre  Mobiltelefone  aus.  Kommunikation 
zwischen den Teilnehmern ist nicht erlaubt. Wenn Sie eine Frage haben, heben Sie bitte die 
Hand. Ein Experimentleiter wird dann zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Frage unter vier Augen 
beantworten.  Leisten  Sie  diesen  Regeln  nicht  Folge,  müssen  wir  Sie  vom  Experiment 
ausschließen. Sämtliche Zahlungen für die Teilnahme sind dann von Ihnen zurückzuzahlen. 
 
Ihre Auszahlung während des Experiments hängt von Ihren eigenen Entscheidungen und den 
Entscheidungen anderer Teilnehmer ab. Die Auszahlung im Experiment wird in Einheiten der 
Experimentwährung (ECU) gemessen. Die ECU, die Sie im Experiment verdienen, werden am 
Ende des Experiments in Euro umgerechnet. Die Umrechnungsvorschrift lautet: 
 
1 Einheit der Experimentwährung (ECU) = 0.025 Euro 
 
Ihre Auszahlung werden wir am Ende des Experiments mit Ihnen abrechnen. Die Auszahlung 
wird  im  Privaten  vorgenommen,  so  dass  keiner  der  anderen  Teilnehmer  Ihre  Auszahlung 
erfährt.  
 
Ablauf des Experiments 
 
Das Experiment besteht aus 10 getrennten Runden. In jeder Runde werden die Teilnehmer 
4er-Gruppen  zugeordnet.  Sie  sind  also  in  einer  Gruppe  mit  3  anderen  Teilnehmern.  Die 
Zuordnung zu 4er-Gruppen ändert sich während der 10 Runden des Experiments nicht. Auf 
den folgenden Seiten wird das Experiment im Detail erläutert. 
 
Jede Runde besteht aus einer Stufe. Zu Beginn jeder Runde erleiden Sie einen Verlust von –32 
ECU. Zusätzlich erhalten Sie 20 Wertmarken. Im Folgenden wird dies als Ihre Ausstattung 
bezeichnet. Ihre Aufgabe ist es zu entscheiden, wie Sie mit Ihrer Ausstattung umgehen. Sie 
müssen entscheiden wie viele der 20 Wertmarken Sie zu einem Projekt beitragen wollen, und 
wie viele sie selbst behalten. Die Konsequenzen Ihrer Entscheidung werden unten im Detail 
erläutert. Zu Beginn jeder Runde sehen Sie die folgende Eingabemaske für die erste Stufe 
(siehe Abb. 1: Eingabemaske). 
 
Die Rundennummer erscheint im oberen linken Eck der Eingabemaske. Im oberen rechten 
Eck sehen Sie wie viele weitere Sekunden Ihnen für Ihre Entscheidung bleiben. Während der 
ersten zwei Runden haben Sie hierfür 90 Sekunden, während der verbleibenden Runden 60 
Sekunden, Zeit. Sie müssen Ihre Entscheidung während dieses Zeitlimits treffen. 
 
Ihre Ausstattung beträgt während jeder Runde 20 Wertmarken. Sie müssen entscheiden, wie 
viele der Wertmarken Sie zum Projekt beitragen wollen indem Sie eine Zahl zwischen 0 und   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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20 in das Eingabefeld tippen. Sie erreichen das Feld indem Sie es mit der Maus anklicken. 
Durch die Entscheidung, wie viele Wertmarken Sie beitragen, entscheiden Sie auch, wie viele 
Wertmarken Sie für sich selbst behalten: Dies ist (20 – Ihr Beitrag) Wertmarken. Nachdem Sie 
Ihren Beitrag eingetragen haben, müssen Sie den „OK“-Button drücken. Sobald Sie dies getan 
haben, kann Ihre Entscheidung nicht mehr geändert werden. 
 
Abb. 1: Eingabemaske 
 
Nachdem  alle  Mitglieder  Ihrer  Gruppe  ihre  Entscheidung  getroffen  haben,  wird  Ihnen  im 
folgenden Dialog die Gesamtsumme der zum Projekt beigetragenen Wertmarken aller vier 
Gruppenmitglieder (einschließlich Ihres Beitrags) angezeigt (siehe Abb. 2: Ergebnisdialog). 
Der Dialog zeigt auch an, wie viele ECU Sie während der ersten Stufe verdient haben. 
 
Ihre Auszahlung besteht aus drei Teilen: 
 
(1) Dem Rundenverlust, den Sie zu Beginn der Runde erleiden. 
Rundenverlust = – 32 ECU 
 
(2) Den Wertmarken, die Sie für sich behalten („Einkommen aus behaltenen Wertmarken“) 
wobei gilt   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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1 Wertmarke = 1 ECU 
 
(3) Dem „Einkommen aus dem Projekt“. Dieser Wert wird wie folgt berechnet: 
Einkommen aus dem Projekt = 0,4 x Summe der Beiträge zum Projekt 
 
Ihre Auszahlung in ECU einer Runde ist folglich: 
– 32  
+ (20 – „Ihr Beitrag zum Projekt“)  
+ 0,4 x Summe der Beiträge zum Projekt 
 
Abb. 2: Ergebnisdialog 
 
Das Einkommen jedes Gruppenmitglieds aus dem Projekt wird auf dieselbe Weise berechnet, 
d.h. jedes Gruppenmitglied bezieht dasselbe Einkommen aus dem Projekt. Sei beispielsweise 
die Summe der Beiträge zum Projekt 60 Wertmarken. In diesem Fall ist das Einkommen jedes 
Gruppenmitglieds: 0,4 x 60 = 24 ECU. Ist der Gesamtbeitrag zum Projekt 9 Wertmarken, dann 
erhalten Sie und alle anderen Gruppenmitglieder ein Einkommen von 0,4 x 9 = 3,6 ECU aus 
dem Projekt. 
 
Für  jede  Wertmarke,  die  Sie  selbst  behalten,  erhalten  Sie  ein  Einkommen  von  1  ECU. 
Angenommen, Sie hätten diese Wertmarke zum Projekt beigetragen, so würde die Summe der   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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Beiträge zum Projekt um eine Wertmarke steigen. Ihr Einkommen aus dem Projekt würde 
dann  um  0,4  x  1  =  0,4  ECU  steigen.  Gleichzeitig  würde  das  Einkommen  aller 
Gruppenmitglieder um 0,4 ECU steigen, so dass das Gesamteinkommen der Gruppe aus dem 
Projekt  um  1,6  ECU  steigen  würde.  Ihr  Beitrag  zum  Projekt  erhöht  damit  auch  das 
Einkommen jedes anderen Gruppenmitglieds. Gleichzeitig verdienen Sie an jeder Wertmarke, 
die  ein  anderer  Spieler  zum  Projekt  beiträgt.  Für  jede  Wertmarke,  die  ein  anderes 
Gruppenmitglied zum Projekt beiträgt, erhalten Sie 0,4 x 1 = 0,4 ECU. 
 
Während der ersten zwei Runden haben Sie 45 Sekunden und in den verbleibenden Runden 30 
Sekunden Zeit, um Ihr Einkommen zu betrachten. Sind Sie damit vor Ablaufen der Zeit fertig, 
klicken Sie bitte auf den „Weiter“-Button. 
 
Danach  erscheint  ein  Informationsdialog,  welcher  Ihnen  die  Beiträge  der  einzelnen 
Gruppenmitglieder zeigt (siehe Abb. 3: Informationsdialog). 
 
Abb. 3: Informationsdialog 
 
Dieser Dialog zeigt, wie viel jedes der Gruppenmitglieder zum Projekt beitrug. Ihr Beitrag 
wird  in  der  ersten  Spalte  in  blau  dargestellt,  während  die  Beiträge  der  anderen 
Gruppenmitglieder in den verbleibenden drei Spalten dargestellt werden. Bitte beachten Sie, 
dass die Reihenfolge der Beiträge der anderen Spieler in jeder Runde zufällig neu bestimmt   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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werden. Der Beitrag in der zweiten Spalte, beispielsweise, stammt generell immer von einem 
anderen Gruppenmitglied. Dasselbe gilt für die Beiträge in den übrigen Spalten. Neben den 
absoluten Beiträgen werden die Beiträge als Anteil der Ausstattung gezeigt. 
 
Während der ersten zwei Runden haben Sie 45 Sekunden und in den verbleibenden Runden 30 
Sekunden Zeit, um diese Informationen zu betrachten. Sind Sie damit vor Ablaufen der Zeit 
fertig, klicken Sie bitte auf den „Weiter“-Button. 
5.2. Punishment Treatment 
Ablauf des Experiments 
 
Im Folgenden wird das Experiment mit einigen Änderungen wiederholt. Jeder Teilnehmer 
erhält eine pauschale Zahlung von 25 ECU zu Beginn des Experiments. Dieser Betrag kann 
genutzt werden, um zusätzliche Verluste während des Experiments auszugleichen. Am Ende 
der folgenden 10 Runden ist das gesamte Experiment abgeschlossen und Sie erhalten: 
 
   Ihr Einkommen aus den ersten 10 Runden 
+ Ihr Einkommen aus den zweiten 10 Runden  
   (einschließlich der Pauschalzahlung von 25 ECU) 
= Gesamtsumme in ECU 
 
Dieses Experiment besteht aus zwei Stufen in jeder Runde und insgesamt 10 Runden. Die 
erste Stufe ist identisch der Stufe im vorherigen Experiment. In der ersten Stufe entscheiden 
Sie,  wie  viele  von  20  Wertmarken  Sie  zu  einem  Projekt  beitragen  wollen  (und  damit 
entscheiden Sie, wie viele Wertmarken Sie für sich selbst behalten). Ihr Einkommen aus der 
ersten Stufe wird exakt so ermittelt wie im vorherigen Experiment. 
 
Für jede Wertmarke, die Sie behalten, verdienen Sie 1 ECU. Für jede Wertmarke, die Sie zum 
Projekt  beitragen,  erhalten  Sie  und  alle  Gruppenmitglieder  0,4  ECU.  Deshalb  erhöht  jede 
Wertmarke, die ein Gruppenmitglied zum Projekt beiträgt Ihr Einkommen um 0,4 ECU. 
 
Unterschiede im neuen Experiment 
 
Jetzt wird eine zweite Stufe eingeführt, die auf das Darstellen des Ergebnisdialogs aus der 
ersten Stufe folgt.  
 
Die zweite Stufe 
 
In  der  zweiten  Stufe  sehen  Sie,  wie  viele  Wertmarken  jedes  der  Gruppenmitglieder  zum 
Projekt beigetragen hat. Zusätzlich können Sie in dieser Stufe das Einkommen jedes anderen 
Gruppenmitglieds verringern, indem Sie ihm Abschlagspunkte auferlegen. Alternativ können   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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Sie  das  Einkommen  unverändert  lassen.  Die  übrigen  Gruppenmitglieder  können  auch  Ihr 
Einkommen verringern, wenn Sie das wollen. Dies ist auf der Eingabemaske der zweiten Stufe 
ersichtlich (siehe Abb. 4: Eingabemaske in der zweiten Stufe). 
 
Sie müssen jetzt entscheiden, ob und wenn ja wie viele Abschlagspunkte Sie jedem Ihrer drei 
anderen Gruppenmitglieder auferlegen. In jedem Fall müssen Sie für jeden von Ihnen eine 
Zahl  angeben.  Wollen  Sie  das  Einkommen  eines  bestimmten  Gruppenmitglieds  nicht 
verringern müssen Sie 0 angeben. Wollen Sie Abschlagspunkte verteilen, so müssen Sie ein 
Minuszeichen vor die Zahl (ohne Leerzeichen dazwischen) schreiben. 
 
Für  diese  Entscheidung  haben  Sie  180  Sekunden  in  den  ersten  zwei  Runden  und  120 
Sekunden  in  den  verbleibenden  Runden  Zeit.  Sie  können  von  einem  Eingabefeld  zum 
nächsten wechseln, indem Sie die Tabulator-Taste drücken oder die Maus benutzen. 
 
Abb. 4: Eingabemaske in der zweiten Stufe 
 
Wenn  Sie  Abschlagspunkte  verteilen,  haben  Sie  Kosten  in  ECU,  die  von  der  Anzahl  an 
Abschlagspunkten, die Sie verteilen, abhängen. Sie können jedem Gruppenmitglied zwischen 
-10 und 0 Abschlagspunkten zuweisen. Je höher die Anzahl der Abschlagspunkte, die Sie 
verteilen, umso höher sind Ihre Kosten. Die folgende Formel beschreibt den Zusammenhang   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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zwischen der Anzahl von verteilten Abschlagspunkten und den Kosten für das Verteilen von 
Abschlagspunkten: 
 
Kosten für das Verteilen von Abschlagspunkten = Summe der verteilten 
Abschlagspunkte 
 
Jeder  verteilte  Abschlagspunkt  kostet  Sie  1  ECU.  Verteilen  Sie  beispielsweis  2 
Abschlagspunkte auf ein Gruppenmitglied, so kostet Sie dies 2 ECU, sollten Sie zusätzlich 9 
Abschlagspunkte auf andere Mitglieder verteilen, so kostet Sie dies 9 ECU. Verteilen Sie 0 
Abschlagspunkte auf das letzte Gruppenmitglied, so entstehen für Sie keine Kosten. In Summe 
hätten Sie 11 Abschlagspunkte verteilt und Ihre gesamten Kosten dafür würden 11 (=2+9+0) 
ECU betragen. 
 
Sie können die Gesamtkosten am Computer ermitteln. Um die Berechnung durchzuführen, 
müssen  Sie  den  Button  „Berechnen“  (siehe  Abb.  4:  Eingabemaske  in  der  zweiten  Stufe) 
anklicken. Sie können dies tun, sobald Sie die Abschlagspunkte eingetragen haben. Im Dialog 
sehen Sie die Gesamtkosten für die von Ihnen verteilten Abschlagspunkte. Solange Sie den 
Button  „OK“  nicht  angeklickt  haben,  können  Sie  (innerhalb  der  verbleibenden  Zeit)  Ihre 
Entscheidung ändern. Um nach der Änderung die Kosten für die verteilten Abschlagspunkte 
zu ermitteln, klicken Sie erneut auf „Berechnen“. 
 
Verteilen Sie 0 Abschlagspunkte auf ein bestimmtes Gruppenmitglied (d.h. Sie tragen „0“ 
ein),  ändert  sich  sein  Einkommen  nicht.  Verteilen  Sie  einen  Abschlagspunkt  auf  ein 
Gruppenmitglied  (d.h.  Sie  tragen  „-1“  ein),  verringern  Sie  das  Einkommen  dieses 
Gruppenmitglieds um 3 ECU. Verteilen Sie 2 Abschlagspunkte auf ein Gruppenmitglied (d.h. 
Sie tragen „-2“ ein), verringern Sie das Einkommen des Gruppenmitglieds um 6 ECU, und so 
weiter. Jeder Abschlagspunkt, den Sie an ein Gruppenmitglied verteilen, wird sein oder ihr 
Einkommen um 3 ECU verringern. 
 
Ob und wie sehr das Einkommen in der zweiten Stufe insgesamt verringert wird, hängt von 
der Summe der erhaltenen Abschlagspunkte ab. Erhält, beispielsweise, jemand insgesamt 3 
Abschlagspunkte  (von  allen  Gruppenmitgliedern  in  dieser  Runde),  so  wird  sein  oder  ihr 
Einkommen um 9 ECU verringert. Erhält jemand insgesamt 4 Abschlagspunkte, wird sein 
oder ihr Einkommen um 12 ECU verringert. Ihr gesamtes Einkommen dieser zwei Stufen 
berechnet sich also wie folgt: 
 
Gesamteinkommen (in ECU) am Ende der zweiten Stufe = Einkommen in der Runde 
 
= Einkommen aus der ersten Stufe (1) 
- 3 x Anzahl der erhaltenen Abschlagspunkte 
(2) 
- Kosten für das Verteilen von 






Abb. 5: Einkommensdialog am Ende der zweiten Stufe 
 
Ist Ihr Einkommen der ersten Stufe (1) abzüglich dem dreifachen der Anzahl der erhaltenen 
Abschlagspunkte  (2)  geringer  als  Ihr  Rundenverlust  (=  -32),  so  wird  Ihnen  nur  der 
Rundenverlust (-32) abgezogen. Berücksichtigen Sie, dass Ihr Einkommen in ECU am Ende 
der zweiten Stufe geringer als der Rundenverlust (-32) sein kann, wenn die Kosten für die von 
Ihnen verteilten Abschlagspunkte größer als das Einkommen in der ersten Stufe abzgl. der 
Verringerung Ihre Einkommens durch das Erhalten von Abschlagspunkten ist. Sie können 
jedoch  größere  Verluste  als  den  Rundenverlust  (-32)  sicher  mit  Hilfe  Ihrer  eigenen 
Entscheidungen vermeiden! 
 
Nachdem alle Teilnehmer ihre Entscheidung getroffen haben, wird Ihr Einkommen in dieser 
Runde im folgenden Dialog angezeigt (siehe Abb. 5: Einkommensdialog am Ende der zweiten 
Stufe). 
 
Während der ersten zwei Runden haben Sie 45 Sekunden und in den verbleibenden Runden 30 
Sekunden Zeit, um diese Informationen zu betrachten. Sind Sie damit vor Ablaufen der Zeit 
fertig, klicken Sie bitte auf den „Weiter“-Button.   KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 
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